The Diminishing Returns to Human Recruiting in Online Labor Markets

Employers often rely on outside recruiters to find workers, but it is unclear whether human intermediaries add value when employers already have access to algorithmic screening tools. We study a randomized experiment in a large online labor market that assigned human recruiting assistance to job postings. Treated employers received 8% more applications and conducted 7% more interviews but were no more likely to hire than control employers with access only to algorithmic tools. Proxies for match quality suggest that at best, the treatment did not improve the fit between employers and workers. Treated employers were less likely to return to the platform to post a later job. We develop a model of delegated recruiting in which recruiters and employers rely on a common noisy signal, which can generate these patterns when their assessments are highly correlated. These findings suggest that as algorithmic screening improves, the scope for intermediaries to add value shrinks because it becomes harder to access independent information.